A New Path for Managing the Governance of Oil Revenues in South Sudan




A “New Path” for Managing the Governance of Oil Revenues in South Sudan

Deng Majok-Gutatur Chol




Ever since South Sudan became an autonomous state in 2005, the country’s top leadership has been managing the oil revenues non-prudently. Poor governance has resulted in public revenues mismanagement, rampant corruption, and theft and missed opportunities. The South Sudanese elitists have marginalized citizens from the governance and benefits of public oil revenues. Instead, the public has been paying a high price for oil production. The oil extraction activities of the consortia of Sudan, China, India, and Malaysia have uprooted powerless indigenous populations from their lands. Reckless oil extraction has resulted in polluted land and water traditionally used for livestock, human consumption and agriculture.

On December 15, 2013, a power struggle within the ruling elite triggered violence lasting for two years. As a result, thousands of innocent lives have been lost and over three million people are displaced or exiled to foreign countries. In the final analysis, the observed typical impacts of the Dutch disease[1] and violent conflicts in South Sudan are direct impacts of poor management and governance of the resource windfalls. It is far too late for the citizens to continue to trust the elites to govern and manage the public oil revenues. An alternative approach to managing South Sudan’s public oil revenues is way overdue.

South Sudan needs a transformative “New Path” for managing oil revenues, with key features including:

  • An apolitical      model divorced from the influence of the powerful political elites.
  • Full participation      of citizens in the management and governance of public oil revenues      enabled by improved public policies that also boost the peace dividend to      the marginalized and destitute population of 10 million.[2]     
  • A trustee fund      model[3]      for South Sudanese management of public oil revenues, allowing citizens to      realize the benefits of oil revenues through taxable incomes paid out from      oil revenues. As a cornerstone of the apolitical management approach, this      trustee system would be less entangled in the influence of the powerful      political elites.


This proposed New Path is based on key principles of the analysis of the Alaska dividend, the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD)[4] as the closest model to a basic income guarantee benefitting South Sudanese citizens. South Sudan Fund Dividends, which should be created, would be legitimized by a legal mandate. The constitutional review committee should establish a provision in the permanent constitution to govern the oil revenues.[5] To ensure expedient implementation of the South Sudan Fund Dividend, the National Revenue Authority (established by a provision in the recent agreement on the resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan) should establish a national oil revenue tribal council, a body that would represent all 64 South Sudanese tribes.


Therefore, the constitutional review committee should allow public referendums on the ratification of the permanent constitution whose key provision(s) should include the role of citizenry in the governance of public oil revenue. South Sudan should immediately set a timeline to switch the management of revenues to the new formula, a function of the national government and national oil revenues tribal council, representing the 64 tribes.


Given proper planning and faithful implementation, this “New Path” approach can minimize issues of looting, corruption, theft, environmental damages, and resources-driven violence, because there would be no single political elite with unmatched political leverage over South Sudan’s “political budget.”[6]


List of Acronyms:

SPLA: Sudanese People Liberation Army[7]

SPLM: Sudanese People Liberation Movement

SPLM: IO- In Opposition[8]

CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement[9]

NRB: National Revenue Board[10]

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

TGoNU: The government of National Unity.

CAR: Central Africa Republic



This paper diagnoses public oil revenues management in South Sudan over the past decade since the state became autonomous as established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 between the Sudan Government and Sudanese People Liberation Movement/Army, SPLA/M. This research offers a viable alternative path to managing public oil revenues in way that minimize ruling elite’s negative influence and extravagant expenditures, and which maximizes benefits to citizens. The paper offers public policy options derived from research findings related to worldwide management and utilization of public oil revenues.


This research paper analyzes and addresses major oil-related ideas and proposals with tremendous macro-economic and socio-political implications.

The key ideas of the research include but not limiting to:

  1. The nature of South Sudan’s National Revenue Authority’s composition (national, state, local, tribal representation), function, and accountability
  2. The considerable challenges and opportunities presented to the Revenue National Authority during the 30 months period of Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU)
  3. The legal mandate for public oil revenues management (wealth sharing, oil revenue allocation laws, and regulation)
  4. The establishment of the role of citizenry in oil revenue management and governance
  5. The concerted involvement of multiple stakeholders in mitigating the effects of oil extraction on environment, human and animal health, land, and water
  6. The possible replication of key relevant principles of the Alaskan model of revenue sharing
  7. The nature and implication of taxation of oil revenue pay out to citizens as taxable income
  8. Lessons learned from the Norwegian model of (generational) sovereign wealth
  9. A prompt move to managing the typical impacts of Dutch disease
  10. Oil and democracy in South Sudan; political and resource power to managing the Nilepet-South Sudan National Oil Companies – to a level on par with Malaysian PETRONAS, Saudi Arabia Aramco, all of which exemplify advanced technology and world class management.[11]


South Sudan’s Economic Overview


Following a half-century civil war with Sudan, South Sudan’s physical infrastructures are severely underdeveloped. Similarly, poverty is widespread across rural populations, impacting 80% of the country’s population. The subsistence agriculture that formerly provided a living for this vast majority of the population is nearly nonexistent. In South Sudan, property rights are not established and price signals are weak because markets are not well organized.[12] Today, South Sudan depends largely upon the import of goods, services, and capital – primarily from Pakistan, China, Uganda, Kenya and Sudan.

Paradoxically, South Sudan is endowed with abundant natural resources. At the time of the new state’s independence in 2011, South Sudan produced nearly three-quarters of the former Sudan’s total oil output of nearly a half million barrels per day.[13]

South Sudan GDP purchasing power parity for the last three years:[14]

$23.5 billion (2014 est.)

$22.83 billion (2013 est.)

$17.65 billion (2012 est.)

Note: data are in 2014 US dollars

South Sudan GDP[15] (official exchange rate)

$14.3 billion (2014 est.)

South Sudan GDP-real growth Rate[16]

2.9% (2014 est.)

29.3% (2013 est.)

-52.4% (2012 est.)

Exports: In 2013, South Sudan exported $2.26 B, making it the 137th largest exporter in the world. The Most recent exports are led by crude Petroleum which represent 99% of the total exports of South Sudan, followed by scrap vessels, which account for 0.126%

South Sudan exports composition[17]

Crude Petroleum










Export Destinations: The top export destinations of South Sudan are China ( $2.25 B), Pakistan ($4.91M). Costa Rica ($815 K), Uganda ($259K) and the United States ($157K)

Export Destinations[18]











Imports: In 2013, South Sudan imported $424 M, making it the 190th largest importer in the world. The most recent imports are led by raw sugar, which, represent 13.7% of the total imports of South Sudan, followed by packaged medicaments, which accounts for 5.8%.



South Sudan imports[19]

Raw Sugar










Origins of imports: The top import origins of South Sudan are Uganda ($149 M), Pakistan ($82.4 M), China ($75 M), and United States ($21.8 M) and France ($17.3 M)



South Sudan imports origin[20]

Import Origin










South Sudan Energy Overview

The government of South Sudan derives nearly 98% of its budget revenues from oil. Oil is exported through two pipelines that run to refineries and shipping facilities at Port Sudan, lying within the sovereign borders of Sudan on the Red Sea. Therefore, the economy of South Sudan will remain linked to Sudan for some time, “given the long lead time and great expense required to build another pipeline”[21], should the government decide to do so.

Table1: Oil refineries in Sudan and South Sudan


Costly diesel generators currently produce electricity in South Sudan’s major cities, such as Juba, Malakal, Bor, Wau, Aweil, and Bentiu. Indoor plumbing and potable water are scarce.[22]

Overview of Petroleum and Other Liquids in South Sudan

South Sudan’s 2015 crude proven reserves was 3.75 billion bbl. (1January 2015 est.), and the nation is the 28th oil producing country in the world. South Sudan’s imports of refined petroleum products, in 2014, 13,050 bbl./day.[23] While South Sudan does not currently produce natural gas, its natural gas proven reserves, in 2015, estimated at 63.71 billion cu m.[24]

South Sudan’s proven reserves of oil and natural gas are located in the Muglad and Melut Basins, which extend into both South Sudan and Sudan.[25] The Natural gas associated with oil production is flared or re-injected into wells to improve oil output rates. However, South Sudan does not currently produce or consumes dry natural gas.[26]

Mineral Resources

South Sudan is abundantly endowed with natural minerals and metals but most of the country remains unexplored. The geology of South Sudan consists of both sedimentary and crystalline basement rocks, in nearly equal amounts.[27] South Sudan’s crystalline rocks are known to contain more than a dozen valuable types of metallic ores. There are also large deposits of non- metallic, industrial minerals that are extremely useful in construction and road building. Unlike petroleum, the mineral wealth of South Sudan has yet to be explored beyond artisanal gold mining.[28]

Legal framework: 2012 South Sudan Petroleum Act

Ownership of petroleum is vested with Government of South Sudan (GOSS) on behalf of the people.[29] According to the Ministry of Petroleum webpage, exploration and production sharing agreements (EPSAs) are awarded based upon open, competitive tender to the best-qualified companies (typically based on price). According to the ministry’s website, South Sudan is working towards full compliance with Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) principles.

Oil Reserves and Production

South Sudan has over 3.75 billion barrels in proven reserves (2015 estimate), ranking among the largest reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Sudan produces two main varieties of oil: Nile and Dar blends. Oil production was at 326,000 barrels/day in 2011.[30] While there is huge potential in untapped oil reserves in known areas, opportunities exist for new exploration of Nile and Dar oil blend reserves that are in high demand in the Asian marketplace.[31]


Oil Production













There are two export pipelines (all transit through Sudan) for crude: Great Nile Petroleum Operating companies (GNPOC)-Nile Blend to Port Sudan and Petrodar-Dar blend to Port Sudan.[32] South Sudan has been exploring alternative pipelines and refinery options. Some feasibility studies of alternative pipelines are ongoing. Five refinery sites have been identified and two refineries have been built, but not yet operational. One site is in Upper Nile (Tangrial) – operated by Ventech Engineers International, and the other refinery in Unity (Bentiu).[33]

In 2012 South Sudan’s Total production was 220K barrels per day, mainly from two wells. Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC) (Blocks 3 & 7 => 185K barrels/day) and Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GPOC) (Blocks 1, 2, & 4 => 30K barrels/day)[34] Sudd Petroleum Operating Company (SPOC (Block 5A => 4.5K barrels/day): Block 5A is located in the Muglad Basin in South Sudan, adjacent to and on the same geological trend as the Greater Nile Oil Project (GNOP).

The block formed part of the concession previously operated by Chevron before the company withdrew from Sudan in the 1980s amid civil unrest. Production from the block began with the Thar-Jath field in 2006.[35] The Mala field came on-stream in 2009. Production was expected to plateau in 2013 at around 26,000 b/d. Crude from the block is exported as part of the Nile Blend via the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline.[36]


Sudan South Sudan


Table 2: Sudan and South Sudan Oil Fields, Blend and Operators

























Since domestic violence erupted in December 2013, South Sudan’s oil production levels have been declining rapidly. The oil wells in South Sudan Unity State have been forced to close down and there is currently only one oil field in operation in Upper Nile State in the last two years

The oil production arrangement between South Sudan and Sudan is based on a very fragile and delicate relationship. This unparalleled fragility of the oil arrangement was put to test in late January 2012 when the government of South Sudan made the unprecedented decision to shut down oil production, handing the key to resume production to Khartoum’s regime. The decision resulted from an impasse in negotiations between Juba and Khartoum over the financial terms and conditions by which South Sudan would export its oil through Sudan.

South Sudan’s bitter reaction was triggered by unilateral actions taken on the part of the government of Sudan to divert some percent of Southern oil passing through its territory. According to officials in Juba, South Sudan, Khartoum’s actions amounted to illegal confiscation of $815 million worth of oil. The government of South Sudan resolved that it would rather see the nation’s wealth sit in the ground safe from further theft at the hand of Khartoum.[37]

Within the past 10 years, net benefits accrued from oil revenues to citizens have been visibly dim. This is due to several factors, chief among them being a South Sudan’s large government that rarely invests and almost only consumes all revenues. Soon after peace was signed with Sudan, in 2005, the government of South Sudan was characterized by a huge size executive branch comprising of the offices of the President, Vice President, 30 cabinet ministries, 30 deputy ministers, and 30 undersecretaries. Additionally, there were 14 commissions whose expenditures were almost similar to those of the ministries.[38]

South Sudan has an exceedingly large General Assembly comprised of 400 members of parliament representing only10 million people; resulting ratio is 25,000 persons per one Member of Parliament. The government is additional inflated by a huge cadre of civil servants, and a large army comprised of former SPLA soldiers, former militia groups, and newly-trained battalions justified by the current war.

As a result, South Sudan has spent billions of dollars on salaries during the decade while oil revenues have dissipated due to mismanagement and poor governance of the natural resources.[39]

Diagnosis of the petro-politics over oil revenues

In South Sudan, geography and ethnicity are functions of the conflict over oil revenues. The ethnic politics of energy in South Sudan is real and widespread. There is uneven distribution of natural resources in the country. Oil is currently produced in only two states: Upper Nile and Unity. The Nuer tribe predominantly inhabits Unity State, with Dinka represented as well. The Upper Nile has the Nuer, Dinka, and Shilluk tribes. Specific oil sites can be found in all villages of Nuer, Dinka, and Shilluk in these two states. The rest of the country [40](i.e., the other seven states) has not been explored yet, but believed to have potential oil reserves.

Whereas minerals such as gold and most other minerals are currently being extracted in the equatorial region of three states (Central, Eastern, and Western Equatorial states.)

The political implications of oil in the internal politics in South Sudan are huge. Oil is a very highly politicized commodity. The politics of oil revenue was a key igniter of the current war, (which has been mediated by IGAD) between a rebel group and the government of South Sudan.

Environmentally, South Sudan’s current oil productions are in geologically sensitive areas of Sudd, where large wet lands drain into the White Nile River. The water runoffs can carry with it toxic chemicals through the land and into the Nile, affecting livestock, agriculture, and domestic consumption of water.

The oil areas are also geopolitically sensitive along the borders of South Sudan and Sudan — former foes still bound by lingering issues in a long “bitter and Incomplete Divorce.”[41]

Petro-Politics and its Adverse Effects on Governance

Presidential degree- removing and re-instating governors, commissioners, national ministers.[42] [43]

Evidence of Petro-Politics and its Adverse Effects on Governance.

  1. Presidential decrees –deployed to remove elected governors or re-instate new governors and county commissioners against the will of the people who elected them in respective states to ascertain the ruling elite’s control of the local politics and dynamics.
  2. Oil revenues are used as, to borrow De Wal phraise, “political budgets” and as carrots to buy or alienate political opponents at national, state, and local levels.
  3. Oil and other natural resources lie at the center of the current expressed desire for federalism. The ongoing struggle over the control of the oil resources was a key factor that triggered desire for federalism in South Sudan. This started with SPLM-In Opposition’s proposal of creation of 11 new states, yielding a total of 21 states followed by the government of South Sudan’s creation of 18 new states, bringing the total number of states to 28. These re-drawings are reminiscent of gerrymandering[44]. The new proposed states are based on ethnicity and natural resources. In fact, the new borders follow the sites of current oil production. So, the call for federalism is actually a call for ethnic and petro federalism.

The central role of oil in South Sudan’s economy has a huge implication on the political economy. Oil is a double-edged sword. On one hand, oil revenue can be used as a catalyst for nation building and national reconciliation, if revenues are used for development (Peace through development[45]). On the other hand, oil revenue can be used as a catalyst for disunity, disintegration, sectarianism, and violence.

This is the paradox of oil production in South Sudan. The war that started in December 2013 and lasted about two years is a case in point. The inequitable consumption gap of oil revenue between the ruling class and the vast majority of public was a key factor that ignited or at least fueled the violence. Also, oil and other natural resources among the key driving forces for a desire for “ethnic federalism” system in the Country.

Geopolitically, anything could trigger a war between Sudan and South Sudan, and oil production would be the first to stop – a reality that would shut down the Government of South Sudan that depends on oil revenue for 98% of its expenditures. In fact, the South Sudan government is so dependent upon oil that the leadership has no capacity to develop alternatives means of economic growth.

Externalities and Market Failures

The negative externalities include very painful environmental costs. Both subsistence agriculture, practiced at the household level, and livestock rearing have begun to diminish. There is a widespread “vulture capitalism” characterized by foreign exploitation, enabled by corrupted officials, and catalyzed by villagers’ naivety. The result is a widespread unprecedented disaster. In the documentary, “We come as Friends,” yet to be released, public land in South Sudan is depicted being grabbed in plenty by corrupt officials who unilaterally lease public land to private foreigners at dismal prices. The documentary evidenced (community) land leases for 99 years to private citizens from around the world. These vulture capitalists are afforded full rights to displace the indigenous population and extract all natural resources beneath millions of acres of land over a century-long lease. The government of South Sudan under the pretext of agricultural production brands all this for commercial purposes and food security.[46]

The Role of China, India, and Malaysia in the oil production in South Sudan has negative externalities on land and water. The foreign National Oil Companies (NOCs) control the current oil sector management in South Sudan. Specifically, South Sudan and Sudan’s energy sectors are dominated by China, India, and Malaysia.

Table 3: Main Oil Companies in Sudan and South Sudan.

Since early 1990s, when the Chinese National Petroleum Company began oil production in the Southern part of Sudan, there has been gross damage to the local community, the environment, water, and land. The Chinese-Sudan regime consortium was a partnership of the parties that did not care much about human rights nor the rights of indigenous population. In fact, Sudan proudly owns a record of severe violations of human rights in South Sudan, Darfur, Blue Nile, Kordofan, and Nuba Mountains. Successive regimes in the Sudan have engaged in a sustained business of ethnic cleansing of its own citizens.

The nature of oil consortia in Sudan and South Sudan exacerbated this condition. When the U.S. Government under President Reagan asked Chevron to abandon their operations owing to wide abuses of human rights on the part of Sudan, the Chinese entered and formed a natural alliance with Sudan. In this alliance of convenience, neither would hold the other accountable for human rights abuses. This is the prelude of the political climate the oil production created in the Sudan. The damages to the local population, land, and environment, as should be expected, are astronomically catastrophic.

The amount of toxic waste deposited into the lands and water represents an absolute exploitation of the “naïve” population. Oil production practices disregard the environment and the local population suffers direct consequences to livestock, farming, and health. Formerly fertile land in the oil areas that had been suitable for agricultural activities for centuries has been negligently polluted. Six months of rains discharge these pollutants to the arming fields and gracing fields each year. These are existential threats for 80 percent of the population that depends on agriculture and livestock. The Chinese, Indian, Malaysian, and Sudan, as well as the South Sudanese government must be held accountable in an international court of law for the striking damages to the lands, water, and the environment. Perhaps South Sudan should diversify its oil producers and markets by adding a well-managed private oil company from a western hemisphere to alleviate the level of environmental damages, exacerbated by the monopolistic behaviors of Asian-dominated production.

Positive Externalities.

Macro positive effects include the government investment in research and development (R&D). The South Sudan Ministry of Education should modify the national curriculum to emphasize science and technology as a sustainable strategy to equip generation with skills needed to manage the energy sector’s upstream and downstream of oil production. The Ministry of Petroleum can embark on R&D to address some of the challenges of extracting oil in the country. A considerable investment should be directed to the state-of-the art technology such as horizontal drilling. In this way, the country can boost the production capacity of the NilePet.

Micro positive effects include the building of potential hydroelectric dams that can provide irrigation and flood control benefits. Perhaps as a measure of mitigating environmental damages, hydroelectric dams can be a double sword measure. Dams can be used to control the flood, preventing runoff waters that carry chemicals into the land and may be used to provide electricity from a clean energy source.

A “New Path” for Managing Oil Revenues and Governance

South Sudan faces key challenges of oil production and export. While the country has the geological luck of owning the oil and other natural resources, it has a geographic challenge. As a landlocked nation state, South Sudan faces numerous challenges of transporting its oil resources to the international market.

The burden of geography forces South Sudan to depend so much on Sudan, its former foe, to transport its own oil through the pipelines controlled by Sudan to Port Sudan. The development of an alternative pipeline is thwarted by economic challenges; therefore, there is a very slow progress on a more favorable regional pipeline infrastructure.

The national oil companies that are producing oil in South Sudan own and operate aged or aging recovery technology that apparently limits the reserves potential.


Other challenges include the need for more foreign investment for further exploration, a quest dimmed by the ongoing downward oil prices and South Sudan’s unique challenge of poor infrastructures.

Finally, the country faces tremendous difficulties with water disposal, pollution, and social conflict. Oil extraction seems to have exacerbated this latter problem, making the oil seems more like a curse than a blessing to the rural population that comprises of over 80% of South Sudan’s citizenry.

Trans-Boundary, Regional and Internal Consideration on the Oil Exports and Pipelines.[47]

  • LAPSSET: Kenya-South Sudan-Ethiopia railway, road, port, and pipeline
  • Kenya: Turkana-Lamu pipeline part of the Juba-Lamu pipeline.
  • Djibouti-Ethiopia-South Sudan-Uganda-Rwanda transport corridor – another initiative under consideration.
  • Uganda-Kenya-Rwanda: Joint Declaration highlights the strategic decision on hand.

Table 4: Crude Oil Pipelines in Sudan and South Sudan

South Sudan may consider rapprochement with Sudan a necessity in the short term. However, the government seems to realize the dangers and vulnerability of depending on Sudan (an unreliable partner) on a long-term basis. Alternative infrastructures of transporting South Sudan’s oil means create an imminent risk of Sudan losing oil transit fees.

Assuming there are enough oil reserves to justify constructing long pipelines, South Sudan would have to weigh the economics, risks, politics, and geography of Lamu port versus the Djibouti port. Djibouti is perceived to be a relatively more secure route and recent expansion of Djibouti Port with external investment places the port ahead of competition in the region. However, East African media expressed concerns that Djibouti port expansion could potentially undermine other initiatives.[48]

There are Benefits of Regional Market, Sharing Joint Infrastructures[49]

a) Value

  • No transit fees
  • Higher value of refined products
  • Will require a limited medium term investment

b) Security

  • Reduced vulnerability to pipeline shutdown
  • Potential for alignment of geopolitical interests

c) ROI

  • Accelerates infrastructure development
  • Promotes simultaneous growth in other sectors

Cost of the International Market, Absence of Integrated Regional Markets


a) Value

  • High transit fees, therefore, less value per BBL

b) Security

  • No route eliminates vulnerability to pipeline shutdown
  • Potential security risks in transit route
  • Risk of competing geopolitical interests

c) ROI

  • Prolongs current reliance on oil revenue; a longer route to infrastructure development
  • Relatively lower ROI

Case Studies, Lessons Learned of Oil Producing Countries

Nigeria Oil Production as a Case Study of Lesson South Sudan Should Avoid.

Nigeria is a case study in the curse of oil.[50] The former central banker estimated that officials were stealing as much as $20 billion in oil profits each year. As a result Nigeria saved nothing during the boom in oil prices that ended last year. Today, while other oil states including Saudi Arabia and Russia are getting by on a cushion of savings, Nigeria is running out of money. Cash reserves are falling dangerously low. GDP growth is likely to fall this year to below 5% from 6.5% in 2014.[51]

Equatorial Guinea Oil Revenue Management Condition- Another Lesson South Sudan Should Avoid.[52]

Equatorial Guinea is perhaps the world’s most striking example of why oil hurts, rather than helps Equatorial Guinea is a typical case of the resource curse as the country’s leaders squandered its oil wealth while its people languished. The GDP of this poor country has shot up more than 125-fold since the mid-1990s when oil was first discovered there, elevating its wealth per capita to the highest level of any country in sub-Saharan Africa.[53] Meanwhile, the proportion of government spending dedicated to health and education in Equatorial Guinea falls well below the regional average. Rather than benefiting the people, vast sums of the country’s oil revenues have gone to bankroll personal purchases for the ruling families and their associates.[54]

Norway Sovereign Fund-Best Case Study, a Lesson that South Sudan Should Learn

Susan Ormiston declared that “Norway is lucky, they have the oil, and are so smart”, their decisions taken decades ago to invest the taxes from rich oil fields are now paying for their future at a time when “oil-rich Alberta faces a multibillion-dollar deficit.”[55]

Norwegian economy is unique. It is a small and very open economy with a high level of consumption and social development, a high investment ratio, virtually full employment, and a good record of economic growth. Norwegian oil and gas reserves are large relative to the size of the economy and with even a moderate level of production they will last far into the next century.[56]

Norway today sits on top of a $1-trillion Cdn pension fund established in 1990 to invest the returns of oil and gas. The capital has been invested in over 9,000 companies worldwide, including over 200 in Canada.[57] It is now the largest sovereign wealth fund in the world.[58]

Literature Reviews: Oil and its geopolitical implications

Michael Ross observed that oil revenues are characterized by “their exceptional large size, unusual source, lack of stability; and secrecy.”[59] South Sudan’s revenue mismanagement proves Ross right. Over its decade in existence as both an autonomous state and an independent state, South Sudan’s oil industry exhibits all four characteristics described by Ross. Statistically speaking, oil revenues constitute 98% of the Government expenditures and the 95% of the GDP. The huge risks associated with handling exceptionally large revenues in a cash-based-system have proved onerous in South Sudan. It is widely understood that untold public oil revenues have dissipated without accountability or recovery.

The challenges of governing the oil revenues in South Sudan can be attributed to the absence of credible and sound institutions. The timing of the birth of South Sudan and that of oil discovery was akin to putting the horse before the cart. The country is younger than its oil sector. Oil was discovered in the late 1980s and politicized in the1990s. The oil had begun to undermine the democratization of South Sudan region before the country was born on July 9, 2011.

Dick Cheney, former U.S Vice President is reported to have declared in 2000—“the problem is that the Good Lord didn’t see fit to put oil and gas reserves where there are democratic governments. [60] South Sudan’s events seem to prove Cheney’s commentary right. There has been a huge disconnect between the public at grassroots and the ruling class. The absence of the U.S. revolutionary slogan, “No taxation without representation” is the presence of petroleum – “manna from heaven” as viewed by the powerful elites.

Too, a king of Saudi Arabia went on a record grieving the seemingly inherent curse of oil in his response to the American company that discovered oil in the Saudi Kingdom:

“Your majesty!” said American oilmen. “We have good news. We have discovered oil in your land.”

“Oh!” the King sighed, “I wish your people had discovered water instead.”

One would have to admire the King’s wisdom. If only the people of South Sudan and the ruling class should realize that their “fresh” water is the most stable economical resource in South Sudan. Water is more valuable than oil itself.

Analysis of South Sudan Energy Security and Geopolitical Implication

The ongoing global oil price macro trends pose tremendous challenge to oil producers, both International Oil Companies (IOCs) and National Oil Companies (NOCs). Certainly, the volatility of oil prices and their implication on political economy and budgetary considerations directly affect a small oil producing country like South Sudan.

Table 5: Below are Price Units per bbl. as of 12/18/2015.[61]

Index Units Price
CL1:   COM WTI Crude Oil (Nymex) USD/bbl. 34.55
CO1:   COM Brent Crude (ICE) USD/bbl. 36.66
CP1:   COM Crude Oil (Tokyo) JPY/kl 27,770.00
NG1:   COM Natural Gas (Nymex) USD/MMBtu 1.76

NYMEX Crude Oil Futures January 2, 2015- January 27, 2016[62]













This market tsunami is de-vulcanizing a half-century OPEC Cartel. The diffusion of influence of the hegemonic OPEC is the biggest story of the new global map of oil production. “Can the Cartel Survive Another 50 years?”, Amy Myers Jaffe and Edward L. Morse, titled their article..

From its founding in 1960, OPEC has been “the most successful commodity cartel in history.”[63] While it remains one of the most extraordinary anomalies in the global economy, the cartel may be falling apart. The Cartel’s most powerful tool — its market power in controlling oil supplies and prices, is being challenged from multiple directions. The erosion of power started with raising internal demand and falling capacity.[64] Too, are the governance issues as they relate to decision-making process[65] within the cartel: consensus or democratic? “Is Iraq’s integration in OPEC good news or bad news?” As a founding member of the group, Iraq is “unlikely to want to break from the cartel.”[66] Iraqi production has been handicapped by wars and could pump more oil as a “new king” of crude when it regains political stability.    

More oil is indeed already flooding the market. Libya’s increasing relative stability means more oil into the market. Additionally, since the crisis of Ukraine, Russia has been considering going East, courting China as its key energy market. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s changing role is compounding the current energy outlook. The king of crude is strategically refusing to plays its traditional role to instill discipline within OPEC. This is made worse by the OPEC cartel’s continued refusal to play their traditional role in modulating the oil supplies by increasing or decreasing their supplies through the old quota system.

The Saudis are threatened by the emergence of unconventional or enhanced oil and gas from the Western hemisphere.[67] The U.S. is on a clear transition from being an oil net importer to oil net exporter. The picture seems like a clash or rather a competition of technological advancement and geological wealth. The U.S.’ oil and gas production is a story of technological breakthrough as hydraulic fracturing is bringing about dramatic increase[68] of oil production, and so are deeper water fuels.[69]

Meanwhile, the Pacific Rim region rate of growth in energy demand has been the highest in the world.[70] This trend, however, is not likely to continue in the long term. In the re-alignment of producers and buyers in the oil market, Russia has become part of the first phase as it is switching its market from Europe to Asia.

The ongoing re-alignment of energy markets, as well as the emergence of new crude producers, and “things falling apart”[71] within the OPEC Carter, have intensified the geopolitical and geo-economical war among the producers and the buyers regionally and internationally.

These macro trends are certainly striking South Sudan‘s oil driven economy to the core. South Sudan one unique but unfortunate geographic challenge of being a landlocked country compounds this outlook. As a landlocked country with a government so desperate to produce its oil now, and in large quantities South Sudan is guaranteed to remain prey to Sudan.

Within the bad one-sided contract agreement, Sudan charges South Sudan through the nose via processing fees, transit fees and transport fees amounting to $25 per barrel. As if this is not bad enough, billions of dollars of South Sudan oil revenues have been set aside for the sustainment of Sudan because the former has split from the latter with more than three-quarters of Sudan’s former oil resources.

A high level analysis of these fundamental realities indicates that current extraction of oil in South Sudan may be economically unsound as the country is operating at a loss. In the eyes of rational policy makers, particularly considering the long term polices, the current costs of producing the oil outweighs its benefits in South Sudan.

South Sudan oil and investment has generated a mix of energy diplomacy activities.[72] The Chinese approach- pragmatic and profitable-is now increasingly presenting problems. China is holding vast oil in conflict-prone regions.[73] Whether it intends to sticks to a seeming doctrine of non-interference in domestic affairs or otherwise, Beijing will be dragged into local conflicts by the dynamics of local and regional petro-politics. China’s quest for oil in both Sudan and South Sudan presents a serious challenge on its relations with the U.S. In light of this dynamic, South Sudan may become a new battleground between U.S. democratic principles of human rights and Chinese neutral human rights policies and the pursuit of oil asset acquisition.

A look at the South Sudan Foreign Policy[74] choices in light of its energy security is whether to go to the Pacific Rim or U.S. or both. However, South Sudan does not have the resources and “soft power”[75]capacity to manage and balance its relationships with both the superpower and the rising superpower.

South Sudan’s Energy Implication on the Region of the “Red Sea Terror Triangle” of Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen.[76]

Sudan, led by successive Islamic theocratic regimes, engages in forms of state terrorism against its citizens. The regime hosted Osama Bin Laden in 1990s during the U.S. President Bill Clinton era. It is no surprise that Sudan adopted a policy for the export of Islamic revolution in 1990 when it established its special link with (Ayatollah) Iran. The Allahu Akbar alliance between President Al Bashir (indicted by the ICC) and Al Turabi led to the “formulation of such radical policies, training bases affiliated with Islamic Terror organization”[77]; Sudan’s role is that of a “magnet”[78] for fundamentalists like Osama Bin Laden to Sudan.

Somalia has fared no better for that whole land has been a fertile ground for terrorism. Somalia is a discrete anarchic environment chaotically ruled by warlords and terrorist groups commissioned in the mission of Al Qaeda. Bin Laden’s activities with Aiman A-Zawahiri- led to the Iranian-Sudanese strategy for the dissemination of Islamic revolution in the Horn of Africa.[79]

Across the red sea is another potential “failed” state: Yemen. Until its unification with North Yemen, the Marxist Republic of South Yemen served as a safe haven for a wide spectrum of terror organizations.[80]

As part of a leg of this triangle, South Sudan was carved out of Sudan in 2011. As a landlocked energy producer that depends so much on Sudan as a transit territory, Sudan’s infrastructure of pipelines and Port at Red Sea, South Sudan is the most vulnerable oil producer in the world. South Sudan has the oil, but Sudan has the key to South Sudan’s current oil productions. “South Sudan had terrifying preview of a future without oil when it shut down its oil production in 2012.”[81] It could not resume without the key (Sudan’s) intervention. South Sudan is therefore a limbless prey to Sudan’s regime predatory fees. Furthermore, South Sudan oil production is prone to terror activities including Sudan state piracy.

The fragile and volatile energy arrangement between Sudan and South Sudan reflect huge security uncertainties and risks of producing oil in South Sudan today. Both Sudan and South Sudan are each fighting rebellions currently. Sudan is fighting organized revolutionaries from the “marginalized”[82] regions of Darfur, Blue Nile, Kordofan, and Nubia mountains, all of which have risen against the Khartoum regime.

Similarly, South Sudan has been fighting different kinds of rebel groups – partly fueled by a need to control oil revenues and partly fueled by tribal differences. Given its regional close proximity with CAR, Somalia, and Yemen, and its deep umbilical cord with Sudan, South Sudan cannot possibly escape falling into the spillover from the terror triangle region.

Inside South Sudan, Islamic radicalism seed is burgeoning and spreading widely. Muslims from Northern Sudan (Sudan) are among the wealthiest merchants owning businesses, and running mosques in South Sudan. Islamic religious and Islam-based-academic institutions have sprung up and are spreading fast to the countryside.

South Sudan is a brewing semi-anarchic environment conducive for terrorist activities. This cash-based, semi-ungoverned region known for tribal conflicts is a rightful candidate to brew Islamic extremism spilling over from Sudan, Somali, and Yemen.

South Sudan is guilty enough of turning into safe haven for terrorist groups owing to its umbilical with Sudan. Sudan and South Sudan share a large 2,185 KM un-demarcated border punctuated by several disputed areas claimed by both sides, including but not limited to the Abyei region and Heglig. Almost 100% of the oil production activities undertaken by the Chinese on behalf on both countries occur along the long border of Sudan and South Sudan.

The two states, Sudan and South Sudan are still joined by conflicts.[83] Both countries are in constant survival mode – often trading diatribes with each accusing the other of arming or supporting rebels in their countries. Almost daily, leadership of both countries eagerly scratches old wounds and attempt to strike a nationalist tone by denigrating the old enemies across the border.

Alternative Uses of Public Oil Revenues: Common Goods

This public policy choice would be joint efforts of Ministries of Finance and Economic Planning, Agriculture, Transport, Health and Education. Below is an abbreviated list of alternative uses of a considerable portion of public Oil Revenues.

  • Direct distribution of 10-15% of oil revenues as taxable income to all citizens
  • A few strategic road networks connecting 10 states over the next three to five years
  • One to two researched-based national public schools in the next 3 to 5 years
  • Three to four national health centers and hospitals in the next three to five years
  • Subsidize subsistent farming to large-scale mechanical agriculture


Final Policy Recommendations

South Sudan should adopt a revenues sharing model as a form of taxable income. South Sudan, like some countries with a resource windfall, lacks the types of institutions and infrastructure needed to manage natural resource wealth effectively. The majority of South Sudanese citizens face continued poverty with little prospect of a significant improvement in their living conditions as their government continues in this vein.

In order to replicate the Alaskan fund model or aspects of it, South Sudan policy makers would find it imperative to understand the fund model’s description. Alaska has probably implemented “most successful example of a direct distribution” of oil revenues to all lawful residents. It is, however, “a conservative model”[84] of a small dividend amounting to only three to six percent of Alaskans’ per capita income. More specifically, it is just a share of Alaska’s oil revenue that goes into the fund, and only the “investment income from this fund” is distributed—subject to a cap of five percent of the fund’s total market value. The fund is managed by the Alaska Department of Revenue and “strong checks and balances within the budget make it in many ways a model of transparency.”[85]

In the case of South Sudan, the amount of revenues to be paid out directly to citizens would need to be determined by appropriate bodies. However, there are two options suggested by literatures:[86]

  1. An extreme model calls for passing 100% of the natural resource revenues on to citizens, with taxation revenues ensued from income supporting the local, state and national governments.
  2. More moderate proposals, such as what Birdsall and Subramanian (2004) proposed for the case of Iraq, calls for distributing at least half of the revenues, returning only a portion of revenue or even just part of the investment income from a natural resource fund, which is precisely the Alaskan fund.

Given poor infrastructures and dismal development in South Sudan, 10 -15% of revenues distribution to citizens for duration of five years, as a pilot project, would be a great start. Generally, the amount to distribute is a function of economic consequences of such distribution, including the impact on work incentives, household savings, and overall macroeconomic stability.[87]

Next, who should receive resource revenues is another key part of the equation? The following are two possible approaches.[88]

a) Universal distributing revenues to all citizens, adult and infants alike.

b) Limiting transfers of revenues to adults, universal suffrage of 18 years and above.

No doubt, the former has the appeal of “eliminating political discretion over which groups should benefit.” However, it can have unintended consequences—such as motivating families to have more children, and South Sudan is already leading the entire world in fertility rate.[89]

The questions of how much revenue to distribute and to who ought to have a broad national dialogue characterized by a free and fair full participation of all stakeholders. After the public sentiment is gauged, South Sudan parliament, the Board of the NilePet, the Ministry of Petroleum, the Revenue National Board, the National Tribal Council, recommended here to be formed, would establish the criteria to streamline a sustainable standard for the distribution of portion, perhaps 10- 15% of oil revenues, paid out to all citizens age 14 or at high school level. The oil revenues income would be taxed at a flat rate of 10 or 15%.

Conditionality of the direct distribution should include but not limiting to a requirement that recipients are either in school, military, working at a regular jobs, and/or managing their businesses, including entrepreneurships and subsistence farming.

Lessons that South Sudan can learn from the Alaska Experience

a) The overall design of fiscal policies could include direct distribution mechanisms, starting small to limit the impact on the labor supply. Limiting the proportion of oil revenues directly distributed to 10-15% would ensure enough revenue is available to the government for the provision of critical public services, as well as to ameliorate the impact of Dutch disease—as stressed by Hjort (2006).[90]

b) Direct distribution is just as subject to corruption as public programs, so such programs should be established within the budget.

c) Direct distribution of oil revenues does not safeguard the needs of future generations.

Therefore, before replicating this model of direct distribution of oil revenue,[91] South Sudan must prepare its fiscal framework by:

a) Determining the level of public revenue and spending necessary to ensure domestic macroeconomic stability and sustainable external balances. South Sudan parliament, Revenue National Board, Council of Ministers would need to embark on the development of comprehensive national budget.[92]

b) Adopting policies that mitigate the impact of volatile commodity prices on revenue.

c) Accounting for uncertainty because there are apparent numerous uncertainties surrounding South Sudan oil production, both in the levels of natural resource production and in how much revenue the economy can absorb.[93]

  1. Saving resources for future generations.

Like most petro-economies around the world, Norway is facing a future where oil is not the golden goose it once was; however, their investment savings place Norway in a far better position.[94]

The current oil market is so bad that even the Saudis, the king of crude, are getting lesser revenue, from lower price.. Garnering oil revenue is no longer a question of sophistication of technology, access spare capacity nor that of agility in producing extra oil to the market. The drivers for the declining market are more basic: fewer demands and larger supplies of crude.

Direct distribution of portion of oil revenues. Since 2005, South Sudan has been a gold mountain where money making takes place but where consumption or expenditures take place elsewhere: Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, U.S, Europe, and Australia. South Sudan’s powerful politicians have houses, families, and children in school, and seek better medical services. Oil has leaked, so to speak, into pockets of a handful of powerful individuals. The South Sudanese war has exacerbated this phenomenon by way of massive displacement of the population to neighboring countries.

In order to reverse this trend, a good portion of South Sudan’s public oil revenues should be paid out to all citizens as taxable income. All citizens must have their ownership rights to natural wealth, lawfully established in the constitutions,. A government should charge a flat rate taxes across board all the revenues paid out to citizens. This model will make the government more accountable to the citizens through taxation revenues. The average citizen will know that oil revenues are public revenues and that by paying taxes to the government, he or she will participate in national dialogue. This arrangement should reverse the current disconnect between the governed and their government.

Managing NilePet national oil company. If South Sudan needs to accelerate the exploration of additional natural resources, the country should capacitate the Nilepet national oil company. The NilePet should be an ideal national institution that can capture more rents.

In the 1950s, governments of developing countries owned their natural resources only in principle, and received a dismal portion of the available rent.[95] These governments could not govern how much oil was being extracted and how much was going overseas. The historic predatory exploitation of natural resources was transformed in the 1970s when the wave of nationalization “swept the global oil industry.”[96] South Sudan cannot afford to fall into this old trap in the 21st century. South Sudan needs to re-negotiate its oil contracts, because the oil consortia of China, India, Malaysia, and Sudan have features of “economic imperialism.” Therefore, South Sudan should develop, and build the NilePet to a level of world-class national companies, equipped with the state of the art technology and sustainable world-class skilled workers.

Incorporating the latest technology to balance declining reserves. While the return on investment for developing South Sudan’s crude oil pipeline may remain in question due to declining production, the integration of technology to restore and maintain pressure throughout the life of the reserve (including the possibility of leveraging previously inaccessible pockets of crude within the existing reserve) could significantly boost more oil production into the market. As has been the case throughout South America and the Middle East, pressurization technology is an absolute must to ensure steady and predictable crude oil output at peak production or other advantageous levels.

Building economically viable infrastructures– South Sudan should invest a portion of its oil revenues to build productive assets: roads, bridges, and school and health centers. The country should also weigh tradeoffs between oil export and domestic refineries. The cost benefit analysis of the current transport route- international markets through Sudan vs. alternative routes- regional markets, should be completed to determine the feasibility of either option. Meanwhile, South Sudan should develop a capacity to refine oil for domestic consumptions and to export refined access products to neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya.

Nationalized research and skills’ development: In order for the oil sector to be sustainable, a tremendous investment in development of productive assets such as human capitals must be a national priority. A portion of national curricula should be matched up with oil and gas sector development. In order to ensure that aspect of national curricula commensurate with skill sets necessary for oil and gas sector development, there is need to bridge research and skills and public policies as part of the classroom learning experiences.

These sets of skills include but not are not limited to:exploration and production (geology, geophysics, petro physics reservoir), engineering; operations (oil field operations management, petroleum plant Superintendents); contracting and procurement (engineering procurement); commercial (crude oil trading specialists, commercial petroleum contracts management; environment, health and safety (EHS) (EHS accident investigations training and experience, environmental monitoring or management.[97]

Managing public expectations and information flows-transparency and accountability. Since the inception of the oil production more than a decade ago, only a very small fraction of population understand the oil sector. Information flows have not been well managed partly because of the nature of the consortia that play pivotal role in the oil production, and partly because the ruling elites in South Sudan have not established a baseline of data of transparency. Information flows ought to be well managed for the public to have clear expectations regarding oil proceeds. Information about oil and gas policy ought to be printed not only in English, Arabic, but also in all established tribal languages to ascertain broader dissemination of such information.

Protection of indigenous lands, wetland, and the environment. As part of the multi-stakeholders approach, there should be sustainable tradeoffs among key stakeholders such as the indigenous population, states, and national governments. The current approach is a zero sum game, where NOCs have alienated the population from the land, rendering the public poor and the environment ruined. All oil companies including Nilepet should exercise social responsibility to pacify the impoverished population. Policies should have requirements to conduct environmental impact assessments prior to any activity likely to have social or environmental impact; high level of contract transparency and accountability with public access information and in contracts negation and contracts agreement; and full participation of all stakeholders including local populations, environmentalists.[98]

Access to information flow could cause an awakening of the consciousness of ordinary citizens to exercise their rights over natural assets, and to challenge bad practices of oil companies and the poor policies of the government.


The last decade has seen dismal development and near nil peace dividends to South Sudanese citizens across the country. A transformative “New Path” to managing public oil revenues is critically necessary. This approach is grounded on the principles of participatory democracy in the management and use of public revenues from natural resources such as oil and minerals. In order to reverse the current oil condition trends (i.e., corruption, mismanagement, environmental damages, and violation of rights of local populations), the citizens must play pivotal roles in the management and governance of oil revenues.

This “New Path” to managing the public oil revenues entails paying out 15-10% of revenues to citizens as taxable income at flat rate of 10%. To ensure a new path of high degree of transparency and accountability, a robust system for monitoring and evaluating the flow and use of public oil revenues need to be lawful and sustainable.

A need for transparency in South Sudan’s oil sector cannot be emphasized enough. Norway and Alaska produced applicable models of transparency in the way the governments collect and budget natural resource revenues. This transparency helps ordinary citizens understand the use of resource wealth and hold political leaders accountable for their decisions.

Chile’s fiscal rules protect resource wealth from the vagaries of political pressure and its strong institutions are able to manage public investment. This helps transform natural resource wealth into productive assets, including infrastructure and human capital.[99]

Most analysts have found that resource wealth is often associated with government corruption that undermines democratic accountability in the form of institutional credibility. In that logic, natural wealth can become a “resource curse.” This idea was captured vividly by Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso, Venezuela’s former minister of mines and hydrocarbons and cofounder of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, who described petroleum as the “devil’s excrement” and warned oil-driven economies of its potential to spawn waste, corruption, excessive consumption, and debt.[100]

In order to be able to escape this doomed trend, South Sudan must embark on a robust public finance management overhaul to ensure the transparency and efficiency of their budget process and the checks and balances in the decision-making processes that are needed to ensure effective use of resource wealth. Otherwise, South Sudan will struggle to follow the positive example of countries like Botswana, Chile, and Norway.

The danger of absolute reliance on oil as a sole panacea is glaring in South Sudan affairs. The South Sudanese people need to understand the inherent nature of oil and its fundamental arithmetic of minus. The South Sudanese should know that oil is a finite natural resource. Unless a society recognizes the imperatives of using oil revenues — instead of consuming it on spot–to create a more permanent development benefits, oil windfalls could deplete in short time. The best use of oil revenues is to use them in ways that enable a society to create long-term benefits to the country.

The “New Path” approach must factor in mechanisms to minimize the impacts of Dutch disease by ensuring that revenues inflows do not lead to permanent currency appreciation and to the decline of agriculture (though the sector is already dwarfed by massive displacement). The manufacturing sector virtually does not exist at this time). As discussed above, a legislative mandate is needed to manage the revenues.

A full implementation of this approach is a big choice. It would allow South Sudan to reverse its gears in order to escape the textbook “resource curse” cases exemplified by Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, and other countries whose natural resources have held them hostage to underdevelopment. The approach has the potential to replicate transferable good lessons from Norwegian Sovereign Wealth model of generational saving, the Alaska permanent fund, and Chilean and Botswana approaches to management and governance of public oil revenues. In choosing the latter option, oil in South Sudan does not remain a “devil’s excrement.”[101]



Ross, Michael L. The Oil Curse.

Collier, Paul. The Plundered Planet

Copnall, James. A poisonous Thorn in Our hearts. Sudan and South Sudan’s Bitter and Incomplete Divorce.

Paine, Thomas. Common sense. Dover Thrift Editions.

Kalicki, Ian H. and Goldwyn David L. Energy & Security. Strategies for A world in Transition. Second Edition.

Shay, Shaul. The Red Sea Terror Triangle

Managing Oil Revenue in Uganda A Policy Note

March 2009
OREA Knowledge Series: No. 1

Doing Business 2010. Reforming through Difficult Times. Comparing regulations in 183 economies. International Finance Corporation, IFC.

Chol, Deng Majok; Dubose, Adolph; Ngong, Akol Aguek. Memo On South Sudan Natural Resources, Harvard Kennedy School, 2014

World CIA Fact Books: Africa: South Sudan

Teague, Mathew. Mysteries of Great Migrations: The Lost Herds of Southern Sudan. Southern Sudan. A shaky Peace. National Geographic

Sharing the Wealth; FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, December 2014, Vol. 51, No. 4Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

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Oil and Gas companies in south Sudan. Fortune of Africa.


OLAV BJERKHOLT, LORENTS LORENTSEN and STEINAR STRØM. Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo) Norway’s sovereign wealth holds lessons for Canada, and South Sudan. http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/norway-s-sovereign-wealth-holds-lessons-for-canada-1.3002803.

https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/28/equatorial-guinea-resource-cursed. AUGUST 28, 2009:

Equatorial Guinea: Resource Cursed. Published inForeign Policy

South Sudan has Africa’s highest population growth. New Nation Reporter

Saturday, 29 November 2014 00:00. http://www.newnationsouthsudan.com/national-news/south-sudan-has-africa’s-highest-population-growth.html




17 AUGUST 2015

Saudi Aramco Journal of Technology – Fall 2015http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home/news-media/publications/saudi-aramco-journal-of-technology.html

Extract from a Kampala Newspaper Jobs Page (from early 2008) for an International Oil Company Prospecting in Western Uganda

Africa in the New World Order. Peace and Security Challenges in the Twenty-First Century.

Olayiwola Abegunrin.


Appendix 1: South Sudan Political Map

Appendix 1
















Appendix 2: Key oil infrastructure in Sudan and South Sudan

Appendix 2


















Appendix 3: The mining sector offers a Greenfield opportunity[102]

To date, only a fraction of the country has been explored, with gold as the primary target of exploration. Other minerals that have been identified include:

Mineral                               Detail                                       Districts


Neutron activation analysis shows   that the gold in South §Kapoeta district Sudan is of high quality §Morukanboloing


Older assessments reported 2-20   million tons of ore grading 2-10% copper

  • HofratenNahas
    §Between Wau and Rumbek §Kapoeta district

Zinc & Lead

Zinc and lead usually occur   together in massive sulphide deposits

  • Juba-Yei-To
    §Between Torit and Wau
Aluminum Three areas of anomalous   aluminum values of above 4.5%
  • Around Juba
    §Raga-Wau-Rumbek §West of Yambio
Manganese At least two distinct manganese   anomalies
  • Juba Nimule-Yei-Amadi(over   35,000 ppm)
  • Wau(1,500-3,500ppm)
Uranium Initial airborne surveys have   revealed extensive deposits
  • Eastern Equatoria

A older study shows deep   deposits covering an area of about Iron 80,000 km2, with Fe2O3   concentrations ranging from 22 to


  • Wau-Raga §Yambio

A company previously identified   8 million tons of marble Marble/Dolomite consisting 52.6% CaO and 0.8%   MgO with insignificant Na2O

and K2O contents

  • Kapoeta district §Torit


[1] Sharing the Wealth; FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[2] http://www.ssnbs.org South Sudan 2008 census

[3] Sharing the Wealth; FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[4] Sharing the Wealth; FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[5] www.goss.org

[6] “Political Budget”, a term coined by Alex De Wal

[7] Dr. John Garang De Mabior, First President of South Sudan, found SPLA/M in 1983.

[8] Sudan People Liberation

[9] CPA, signed between Sudan and SPLM in 2005, brokered by the U.S.

[10] NRB, established in the recent Peace Agreement between South Sudan Government and the rebel

[11] Saudi Aramco Journal of Technology – Fall 2015

[12] World Fact Book: Africa, South Sudan

[13] World Fact Book: Africa, South Sudan

[14] World Fact Book: Africa, South Sudan

[15] World Fact Book: Africa, South Sudan

[16] World Fact Book: Africa, South Sudan

[17] http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/ssd/

[18] http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/ssd/



[21] World Fact Book: Africa, South Sudan

[22] World Fact Book: Africa, South Sudan

[23] World Fact Book: Africa, South Sudan

[24] World Fact Book: Africa, South Sudan

[25] Ministry of Petroleum: www.goss.org

[26] Ministry of Petroleum: http://www.goss.org/index.php/ministries/petroleum-mining

[27] [27] Ministry of Petroleum: http://www.goss.org/index.php/ministries/petroleum-mining

[28] Ministry of Petroleum: http://www.goss.org/index.php/ministries/petroleum-mining

[29] South Sudan Transitional Constitution: http://www.goss.org/index.php/ministries/petroleum-mining

[30] Oil and State Building in South Sudan. http://www.usip.org

[31] South Sudan. The Unexplored Frontier: Investment Opportunities in South Sudan’s Natural Resources.

[32] United States of Institute of Peace: http://www.usip.org

[33] Ministry of Petroleum: http://www.goss.org/index.php/ministries/petroleum-mining


[35] South Sudan Oil Policy Memo, Page 9 of 1, Aguek, Chol, DuBose

[36] Ministry of Petroleum: http://www.goss.org/index.php/ministries/petroleum-mining

[37] FACT SHEET: What Could the Oil-Shutdown Mean for South Sudan? Jenn Christian March 2012, Enough Project

[38] Government of South Sudan: http://www.goss.org

[39] Government of South Sudan: http://www.goss.org

[40] Number of the states, 28, or 21 is being discussed between the government, and rebel

[41] Copnall, James. A poisonous Thorn in Our hearts. Sudan and South Sudan’s Bitter and Incomplete Divorce

[42] Government of South Sudan: http://www.goss.org

[43] South Sudan TV

[44] http://beta.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gerrymander

[45] Dr. John Garang De Mabior

[46] We Come As Friends: http://www.wecomeasfriends.com/us/

[47] http://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/153063/construction-of-lamu-port-kicks-off-next-month/


[49] Chol, Deng Majok; Dubose, Adolph; Ngong, Akol Aguek. Memo On South Sudan Natural Resources, Harvard Kennedy School, 2014

[50] RUCHIR SHARMA, Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2015

[51] RUCHIR SHARMA, Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2015

[52] AUGUST 28, 2009 Equatorial Guinea: Resource Cursed

[53] AUGUST 28, 2009 Equatorial Guinea: Resource Cursed

[54] AUGUST 28, 2009 Equatorial Guinea: Resource Cursed

[55] Susan Ormiston, CBC News: Mar 20, 2015

[56] Susan Ormiston, CBC News: Mar 20, 2015

[57] Susan Ormiston, CBC News: Mar 20, 2015


[59] The Oil Curse, Ross, Michael L. page 27

[60] The Oil Curse, Ross 63

[61] http://www.bloomberg.com/energy

[62] http://www.wtrg.com/daily/crudeoilprice.html

[63] Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security, 121

[64] Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security 128

[65] Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security 128

[66] Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security 130

[67] Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security, 323

[68] Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security, 327

[69] Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy Security 551

[70] Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security, 279

[71] Things Fall Apart, Chinua Achebe

[72] Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security, 289

[73] Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security, 290

[74] Kalicki and Goldwyn, Energy and Security 545

[75] Joseph Nye, Soft Power

[76] Shay, Shaul, The Red Sea Terror triangle: Islamic terror

[77] Shay, Shaul, The Red Sea Terror triangle: Islamic terror, 40

[78] Shay, Shaul, The Red Sea Terror triangle: Islamic terror, 40

[79] Shay, Shaul, The Red Sea Terror triangle: Islamic terror, 79

[80] Shay, Shaul, The Red Sea Terror triangle: Islamic terror 113, 118

[81] Copnall, James. A poisonous Thorn in our hearts, 6

[82] Dr. Mabior, John Garang de. New Sudan vision.

[83] Copnall, James. A poisonous Thorn in our hearts, 220

[84] Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[85] Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[86] Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[87] Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[88] Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[89] South Sudan has Africa’s highest population growth: New Nation Reporter. Saturday, 29 November 2014

[90] Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[91] Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[92] FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, December 2014, Vol. 51, No. 4. Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[93] (FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, December 2014, Vol. 51, No. 4. Sanjeev Gupta, Alex Segura-Ubiergo, and Enrique Flores

[94] Ormiston, Susan. Norway’s sovereign wealth holds lessons for Canada, OLAV BJERKHOLT, LORENTS LORENTSEN and STEINAR STRØM. Central Bureau of Statistics, Oslo

[95] Ross, Michael 36.

[96] Ross, Michael 37

[97] Extract from a Kampala Newspaper Jobs Page for an International Oil Company Prospecting in Western Uganda.

[98] Collier, Paul, The plundered Earth, 207

[99] Gupta, Segura-Ubiergo, and Flores, 2014

[100] Gupta, Segura-Ubiergo, and Flores, 2014

[101] Gupta, Segura-Ubiergo, and Flores, 2014

[102] South Sudan Ministry of Petroleum and Mining

Deng Majok-Gutatur Chol holds an MBA from George Washington University and an MPA from Harvard Kennedy School of Government. You can contact him via email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it..

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