The failed attempt by Justice and Equality Movement to Capture Khartoum

The move by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebels to take control of Khartoum cities took all of us by surprise. This came just few weeks after the merging of different factions in an agreement signed in Juba. In the aftermath of the assault, one thing came very clear: JEM decided for the assault on its own without other factions taking part. If all the rebel movements in Darfur were to take part in this latest incident, what would have been the reaction of Khartoum over the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) which facilitated the merger of the five different factions involved in Darfur fighting against Khartoum government? It seems GoSS is failing in its effort to find solutions to other conflicts that have direct impacts on the realization of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement given the recent failure of the Lord Resistance Army rebel leader Joseph Kony to sign the final peace agreement with the government of Uganda.

The latest action by the JEM shows dissatisfaction with all that was agreed in Juba in regards to their coming together as one movement in Darfur to seek a final solution to Darfur conflict through political negotiations.

Another important issue that come to mind is the consequences of the assault after the withdrawal of the rebels from Omdurman. They tried but failed to achieve their goal of capturing Khartoum. But have they really failed? As far as I am concerned, I would argue that, they have not failed but succeeded to a certain extent. I'm saying this based on the experience of SPLA attempt to capture Juba in July 1992. After that attempt, Southerners of all works of life and professions were subjected to something they have never imagined Arabs could do to them at any cost. Some of the Equatorians who were hesitant to accept SPLM as a movement of liberation and even when the Equatoria army officers decided in a month before the attempt to join the SPLA after the effort to persuade them to stage a coup from within failed. The southerners in Juba instead decided to remain loyal to their masters. It wasn't long before they were to learn the hardest lesson under the so called "Tabur Kaamis" in which thousands of people were arrested, tortured and killed. The hardest institutions to pay the price at the time were the prison warders and wildlife service men. Comparing that to the recent fighting in Khartoum city, Khartoum has begun another "Tabur Kaamis" on the Darfurians living in the city and other major towns under its control. According to the reports from different sources and even the government itself, there is sporadic arrest.

Innocent people are beginning to pay the price of JEM assault just because they are Darfurians living in Khartoum. Sooner, the victim will learn to know where their brothers and sisters are just as southerners did in the aftermath of 1992. My advice to Khartoum government is that, the more the government continue to arrest innocent people, the more, the fragile divides continue to widen in the north. That means Khartoum is going to have more enemies than in the past. JEM should not rejoice of any success in their attempt to siege power in Khartoum. They should have learned a lesson from the Chadian rebels few months ago. If capturing a city like Khartoum with just few men mounted on vehicles, SPLA could have done that more than two decades ago. JEM has put more lives into danger although this attempt might show little of their ability to wage war on the army that has been engaged in wars for the last fifty-five years.

International community should act now to arrest the situation before it worsens. As Khartoum gets a bloody blow onto its mouth, the general public in Khartoum are beginning to question the ability of the security forces in protecting them. Hence, the security forces might respond swiftily to proof that they are still under control of the security situation just as President George Bush did in the aftermath of September 11 following the terror attacks in the United States by invading Afghanistan and Iraq. GoSS should draw lessons from its efforts of mediations that are failing even before the sweats haven't dried from dignitaries' coats after running up and down to reconcile conflicts that have direct or indirect impact on the interest of the south.