Security Desk - What was JEM thinking?
May 15, 2008 (Pennsylvania, USA) - The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) raid on Khartoum’s twin city of Omdurman was bold and probably the least expected. In an attack reminiscent of that launched by Chadian rebels on their city of N’djamena, the JEM rebel launched their Blitzkrieg across the vast desert of Northern Darfur and Kordofan before being met head-on in Omdurman. Chad may have wanted to repay Khartoum in kind for its role in rebels’ assault on N’Djamena that nearly resulted in the overthrow of Idris Deby’s government. In fact, it is said that all the cabinet members had actually fled Chad because the game was clearly over. Chad cut a deal with French who provided all the intelligence and even coordinated a counterattack on rebels. In return, the French aid workers accused of abducting Darfurian and Chadian children were pardoned by Deby as a gesture of gratitude for saving his regime. What analysts probably tend to overlook is the fact that Chadian rebels came out of this stunt severely weakened.
The Sudanese intelligence learned a very good lesson from this adventure: we could lure JEM (which is militarily superior to SLA) to Khartoum and finish them off. And this has clearly paid off. JEM lost most of its fighters and its command is in disarray. It has been severely weakened that it will never launch a similar attack in a very long time. Conveniently, the president of the republic was out of town when this thing went down. It is even rumored that the NCP security apparatus had advised important people in its hierarchy to go into hiding prior to JEM attack. When the first JEM column arrived, the paramilitary and military units were waiting. It was a disaster for JEM from the start. Most of them quickly discovered that they had been duped and turned around. This brings us to the most important question: What was JEM thinking?
Clearly, the JEM leadership was hoping that the army wouldn’t be up to the task of waging an urban warfare and with help from its allies inside the army, they could win some over and instigate an internal coup. According to some media releases attributed to JEM, they believed that they had reliable collaborators within the Sudanese army and this might be the case. The New York Times quoted some unnamed western source in Khartoum that some mid-level and low-level officers who should have been coordinating the offensive against JEM were sympathetic to if not outright part of JEM’s plan. In the end, the reliable security apparatus took over the entire operation and executed it flawlessly. There is no way JEM could have raced across the desert without being intercepted and neutralized. Why would Khartoum risk its power base? It knew that it was impossible to capture Khartoum given its strategic location. You need to initiate any assault on Khartoum from Eritrea.
This question brings us to the final hypothesis: The security organs had planned the whole thing from the start hoping that they would exact the same blow that was dealt their Chadian allies in N’Djamena. The army knew that the JEM elements have been spotted in Kordofan and did little to confront them. Fighting them in Kordofan or elsewhere in Northern Darfur would have done little to neutralize JEM. After all, that is exactly what they have been doing for the last four years. Given the strategic location of Khartoum, any attack from the west is not likely to succeed. All important government installations and seat of power are located on the eastern part of the Nile River. Knowing this, the security apparatus concluded that Omdurman is not as important and can be defended if necessary without putting the all-important Khartoum at risk. It would also lengthen the distance that the JEM would have to travel and once confronted; they will be in for a long and bloody retreat. This is exactly what happened and JEM leadership never took this ugly part of their demise into the consideration. It is a mistake that it will regret for a long time.
Going back a little further and looking at the military history would have informed the JEM leadership that this is a bad idea. Forgetting the most recent episode involving Chadian rebels, a look at the German’s race across the Russia in World War II resulted in their defeat from Stalingrad all the way to Berlin. They were far from the base and had limited means to sustain an offensive in the face of a determined foe. Military power is a function of a number of factors and distance is very important. It is crucial that you defeat your enemy as you push it towards the city because it will be weakened psychologically. JEM never defeated the SAF as it made its way to Khartoum. It wanted a shortcut to power and this is what motivated its push to Khartoum even when all signs indicated that this was a bad military strategy. The answer to topic question is that JEM never thought out the merits and disadvantages of its stunt and this explains why the defeat was instantaneous and brutal. It is a good lesson that will be studied for a long time.
*Mariar Wuoi writes a column with New Sudan Vision, tagged Security Desk. He is a B.S. Energy and Environmental Economics, Geographic Information Systems student at Penn State University, U.S.A.
