Does Abyei problem need a third party?
Abyei is a topic that makes many of us nervous. A few of us could focus on historical mistakes that led to Abyei being part of Northern Sudan. These mistakes include naivety, low self-esteem and unrealistic and phantasmal hopes.
However, a good number of us would want to see resolution that will see Abyei annexed to South without any further bloodshed.
When SPLM pulled out its ministers from the government of national unity in October last year, citing reluctance of National Congress Party in implementing CPA, Abyei was part of the list.
But NCP officials are slick. They know what they could do to pacify the disgruntled SPLM officials.
NCP agreed, in principle, to some of the SPLM requests. NCP wanted to cheat the world that they were not the problem. However, the Abyei border issue was reserved for presidency after President Beshir rejected the recommendations of Abyei Border Commission; famously known as ABC.
Beshir commits only to Abyei issue but emphasizes that the border of 1905 be respected. This means nothing. The borders of 1905 go against the demands of the SPLM. This issue remains controversial, divisive and inflammatory.
But what confuses the average southerner is why the presidency still speaks openly to the media about it when the issue is left for the presidency to deal with. Why is the border demarcation important if Abyei people are to choose where to belong in a referendum? How far has the presidency gone in dealing with the issue? We need to know.
On his recent visit to Cairo, president Kiir complained about the hurdles facing CPA implementations. He blamed NCP for any obstacles. Kiir says that he stands by the report and that the report is binding to NCP. Way to go Mr. President!
What the general populace needs to know is this: is leaving issues to presidency another term for ‘irresolvable issues we can’t reconcile’? What was the presidency to do if the words are still being traded as to what is to be accepted? We need to know.
Leaving issues with the presidency seems to be another way of saying, ‘we can’t accept or deal with these issues’. However, these are mere speculations based on the event surrounding Abyei and the would-be aftermath.
Sudanese leaders have to be straight about how they deal with issues. To Southern Sudanese, they need to be cautious. Slow response to issues is Northern Sudanese way of frustrating demands of the Southerners.
This is exemplified by Juba conference (1947) and Addis Ababa agreement of (1972).
President Kiir needs to stick to the words he told President Hosni Mubarak and dismiss the notion that Abyei issue be left with presidency. This is empty, cunning and unrealistic.
New Sudan Vision recommends that a third party be called into solving the Abyei issue even if a call for a third party reflects negatively on both parties. The remaining parts in the CPA were seen as within the reach and capability of both parties. So far they haven’t solved the Abyei issue.
