Sudan’s Jonglei Canal: The Imperial Intentions of the Second Digging

By Joseph Deng Garang

Presently, a big empty ditch, the Jonglei Canal has come at a steep price. The Jonglei Canal is synonymous with African politics of water. In 1978, this joint venture between Egypt and Sudan began with the help from France. Six years later, the project failed to reach its goal of finding water. Water has increasingly become the world’s most inevitable source of conflicts, especially in the 21- century. The problem, however, proves to be more serious in Africa. Despite the fact that the African continent boasts the presence of the River Nile, which exists as the “River of Life” thanks to its nourishing ability directed at serving hundreds of millions of people, animals and plants, water is still scarce.

In his book, The Waters of the Nile, Robert O. Collins describes the Nile “as one of the great natural and romantic wonders of the world. It is the longest river, flowing south to north 4,238 miles over 35 degrees of latitude through civilization of great antiquity” (Collins 1). The Nile is a natural gift, so marvelous that experts and novices agree that its flow and greatness defy any comparison or measurement. Eight other African countries share the Nile waters. These countries are Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Eritrea. All water bodies, tributaries and canals, have inseparable connection to the Nile; the Jonglei canal bears the same connection to it. Ancient Egypt Online explains that, “the Nile River has played an extremely important role in the civilization, life and history of the Egyptian nation” (2). Over the years, the Nile River has helped Egypt through silt that remains after the River overflows. This soil is the best for agriculture.

Figure 1: Map of the Nile River

Source: Modern Map of the Nile

In May of 2006, Egyptian authorities met to deliberate on the future development of Nile water, especially in relation to the other African countries sharing the Nile River Basin. At the meeting, the Egyptian Minister of Irrigation stressed the need for “resuming” the digging of the Jonglei Canal that stopped during Sudanese civil war (Info Prod Research1). The Jonglei canal is incredibly valuable to Egypt and North Sudan because if completed, it would bring additional water for irrigation and electricity to the desert regions of northern Sudan and Egypt. Southern Sudanese, however, believed that the Jonglei Canal developed because of British and Egyptian interests that have roots in the development and the use of Nile water.

During the colonial period, Britain and Egypt ruled the Sudan jointly, until it got “independence in 1956” (Ronen 81). Prior to Sudan’s independence, the British carried out some of the most ambitious schemes, such as the construction of the historic Gezeira irrigation scheme and the Aswan High dam to channel irrigation water for cotton growing. Over the years, debates have raged over the sharing of Nile water. As a result, an agreement was entered into in 1929 that provided the mechanism for allocating water. It turned out that Egypt got an exceptionally high share, in part because of its aridity which makes the Nile its sole dependable source of water. After the agreement was made, Sudan and Egypt began to focus their efforts on conserving the valuable Nile waters using ingenious approaches. The approaches underscore the whole issues of strategic importance of the Nile River.

These two countries, in effect, turned to the Sudd region of Southern Sudan as the potential cure-all to the lack of water. Collins defines:

[The] sudd is derived from the Arabic word sadd meaning barrier or obstacle ,and came into general use among the European and Arab merchants and traders whose passage through the swamps in the 19th century was impeded by large dams of aquatic vegetation blocking channels. Today the term is used to describe the permanent swamps of the Nile, or more loosely, to refer to the whole...flood plain, including the seasonal wetlands as well as the permanent swamp. (66-67)

The Sudd forms a collection or a cluster of lagoons filled with water plants with shallow roots, within which animals like crocodiles and hippopotamus live.

Given such obstructive nature, people may ask why the two countries resorted to the Sudd region as a possible water solution. But, there are unique environmental qualities that made the Sudd the center of attention. In fact, the British, Sudan and Egypt studied the seasonal pattern of the Sudd region in relation to the White Nile. The White Nile is one of the Nile tributaries; it gets its water from Ethiopian highlands, the Great Lakes, and from rains. The Egyptians and British wrapped their study by concluding that the White Nile was spilling and drying out intermittently. Considerable tons of water was getting lost through underground drainage and evaporation, and the two countries were working frantically to find means of reducing that waste.

The African Unification Front estimates that with Egypt frantically searching for water solution, “the Jonglei canal is supposed to bypass the Sudd region and direct downstream a proportion of the water considered lost each year by spill from the river and evaporation in the swamps”(3). After the study, both countries conceived the idea of digging the Jonglei Cana. The Jonglei, by way of description, is a state within the Sudd region. The Canal got its name simply because it was passing through the Jonglei region. The Canal started with plans and many rounds of negotiations involving Egypt, Sudan and France. Negotiations were tortuous; but in 1976, the final document was signed, allowing the French consortium called the Compagnie de Constructions Internationales to undertake the Canal digging

Figure 2: The sudd -- largest swamp in the world

Source: courtesy of Sudan's Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources

This opportunity came as a blessing to all sides. For France, their Bucketwheel, the largest canal excavator, was ready for use after years of sitting in the sands of Pakistan doing nothing. George Tombe Lako of the African Affairs describes the machine as “the world’s largest single mechanical digger, moving an average of 60,000 cubic meters of earth per day…consuming 20 tons of diesel oil per day” (Lako 18). Yahia Abdel Magid, the Sudan Irrigation Minister at the time, became enthusiastic about the deal because he had come from the visit he made to Pakistan after the Bucketwheel had just finished the Chasma-Jhelum canal. To Mr. Magid, the feeling that the world’s greatest technological triumph in canal digging was gracing his land was more satisfying than anything.

To illustrate the Bucket wheel further, Collins made this description as the machine tore through the sands of Jonglei in 1980:

It was an awesome machine: it’s towering bulk, 2300 tons, 70 m. wide, and 25 m. tall, was dramatically accentuated by the flat Nilotic plain, stretching without relief on either side of the canal to the distant horizon. The wheel itself, 12.5 in. diameter, with its 12 buckets each with a capacity of 3 meter cubic revolved about once every minute …to excavate 3000 meter cubic an hour, digging a canal over 40 m wide at a rate of 2 kilometers a week.(348)

The digging of the Canal was under the management of French Consortium that made sure all technical expertise and supplies were on hand. The government of Sudan was charged with providing fuel, which proved costly day by day.

Figure 3: The bucket wheel Excavator

Source: Extreme Excavators.

As the Canal progressed, discussions heated up in Sudan. Southern Sudanese began doubting the motives of the Canal. They started interpreting signals about how Egypt and Sudan government have always nursed intentions of political and economic marginalization, always approached through political dominance and control of the untapped resources in South Sudan. Feelings started welling up in the minds and hearts of students, politicians, and farmers in South Sudan. After a year, students at the Southern town of Juba began staging demonstrations against the Canal. The spate of demonstration was in addition to the numerous requests sent to the French CCI by the leaders of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, of the possible stoppage of the project. After months of exchanging memoranda and letters, the French company that was responsible for the Canal failed to heed those warnings, and concerns voiced by Southern Sudanese. The SPLM, acting in the interest of all marginalized Sudanese, brought to a screeching halt the six-year work of one of the world’s most ambitious projects in canal excavation. The Bucketwheel, burnt, left behind a 260 km canal 100 km shy of completion. To this day, the Canal has remained an eyesore for wildlife and pastoralists.

Since then, the Sudan has been at war with itself. However, in 2005, the government of Sudan and the SPLM signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (the CPA), putting a relative calm to the pernicious status quo by the northern regimes. Resuming the digging of the Sudan’s Jonglei Canal after the 21-year war will bring irreparable damage to both the environment and the country’s population in the South.

As mentioned, there are political dimensions to the revival of the Jonglei Canal; there is no doubt the war that just ended between the government of Sudan and the former rebel Movement started or had its genesis in the Jonglei Canal. For generations, there have always been politics of oppression, under-representation and marginalization in the Sudan.

Figure 4: The Jonglei Canal

© Katri Burri/Panos Pictures
The Jonglei Canal under construction

Source: Global Eye Secondary, Jonglei Canal, Sudan

The same patterns have always been playing themselves out in areas of Sudanese political life, whether in the north or south. Sudan has been sporting a legacy that has a colonial heritage; one that the colonial administrators, English and Egyptians, were happy to leave behind as underdevelopment of the south. According to an article from the Mayflower Hill “the government handling of the Jonglei Canal project epitomized the north’s exploitation of the south’s natural wealth, fueling a resentment that contributed to the outbreak of war in 1983” (Hill 3). The article implies that the project came about in a coercive manner, failing to recognize the southern political voice right from its conception. In some bullying fashion, the government of Sudan inflated the canal’s benefits and promises to the local pastoralists in the areas. The point behind these promises was to get the work done as soon as possible so as to quicken the reaping of benefits by both Egypt and Sudan, without any unrest from the South. So the canal involved some external influence.

The Mayflower Hill, hinting at such influence, defines “conflict entrepreneur as any individual or entity who has the potential to gain materially, politically or socially from the prolonging of the Sudan’s wars, and who acts to prolong said wars solely for the purpose of exploiting that potential” (Hill 4). The Sudan peace process that the world witnessed in 2005 addressed issues of resource allocation. The same peace has given the South Sudanese their inalienable right of self-determination, meaning if the North does not follow or implement all the peace clauses, the South will secede as a country on its own. In retrospect, the Sudan government and Egypt fear the prospects of South Sudan’s secession because such an idea spells a major disaster. It will mean losing a strategic part of the Sudan that is ridiculously rich with untapped resources (oil, minerals); it will equally mean losing the best part of their political future that rests with the Sudd region; plus the two countries don’t want any additional restrain on the Nile River because having the South as a country will mean splitting the share of water. The overall consequence of leaving South Sudan to slip from the colonial map will put an end to Sudan and Egypt’s longstanding aspirations of perpetual political rule and the idea of Islamizing that part of Africa.

Resuming the digging of the Jonglei Canal will render the developmental process meaningless because the actions on the Canal will be a major diversion from the clause tying the country under wealth sharing protocol. Right now, the wealth sharing formula is 50:50, meaning that South and Northern Sudan share oil revenues on an equal basis. This gives south Sudan a chance to evolve to make up for lost development opportunities. South Sudan lacks educated people because as part of the political design to keep them out of the political process, their children have always had no education. Both Egypt and North Sudan capitalized on lack of educated southerners when they began conceiving the idea of the Canal. Southern Sudan now view any attempts at reviving the canal, especially in the midst of an agreement, as being politically expedient, and with regard to environmental effects.

The canal has major environmental effects for the Sudd region. These effects include ones that are grave in measure. Known for its rare ecological diversity, the Sudd is considered the world’s largest freshwater wetland. It is home to the many oil blocks that world companies covet. These oil blocks bear numbers relative to their positions on the grid. They are Blocks 4, 5, and 5 A.; a company like Lundin has concessions. The Sudd is also an ideal habitat for some of the world’s most rare species of birds and most beautiful animals. For example, it is the only place in the world that houses shoebill storks. The Shoebill, defined by Collegiate Dictionary, is a large broad-billed wading bird of the valley of White Nile that bears resemblance to the storks and herons. Over 500 species live here in the Sudd. The Sudd also prides itself as a vessel for numerous fish, zebras, giraffe, ostriches, and antelopes. Estimates by the World Wildlife depict the sudd as the home of “over four hundred bird species and one hundred mammal species”(2). The impacts of the Jonglei Canal pervade not only the lives of people in the vicinity, but also those of all other animal; the perception in Southern Sudan has been negative. The Arab Union of scientists and Researchers admitted:

Since the beginning of the century the Jonglei canal project has been debated by develomentalists and environmentalists. Motivated by the desire for more water downstream and the prospect of uncovering a vast expanse of fertile land, to drain the Sudd swamps of the White Nile at Jonglei would destroy home to millions of migratory birds and thousands of hervivores.Among all adverse environmental consequences, the most dramatic one might be the meteorological changes of rainfall patterns in the neighboring countries. (Megahed 7)

As a result, the majority of pastoralists will experience conflicts over the scarcity of water because their animals need water and green pastures that require hydration. The Dinka and Nuer, who are the predominant tribes around the Sudd, practice mixed agriculture: cattle, crops, and fish rearing.

George Tome Lako of the African Affairs said “the Dinka cultivate a number of crops, namely: Dura (sorghum), tobacco, pumpkins, maize, okra, lubia(bean), groundnuts, and sesame” ( Lako15).These crops depend on water from the Nile, with replenishment from seasonal rainfalls. This pattern has always been the rhythm of survival for people in the area. Although the region suffers occasional bouts of floods, the same calamities are accepted in a region that is faced with aridity. As underwater gets sucked away by the Jonglei canal, rainfall patterns are altered. Sub-Saharan Africa, which is adjacent to the canal, is a region that lacks rains and agriculture and chances of the Sudd turning into that same desert are within earshot. The Dinka and Nuer plant their crops in clay soils which have water retention. If that gets compounded with lack of rainfall, people suffer from droughts which are the farmers’ worst enemies.

The other part of agriculture that is so dear to the local people around Jonglei is their system of rearing animals. This system, called animal husbandry, depends to some degree on water availability because animals need green pastures, and water to drink. These pastoralists keep cows, goats, and sheep. The more water there is the more it leads to a greater yield of crops and a healthier group of people. Milk from cows and goats are the best sources of protein for the Dinka and Nuer people. The Dinka people’s love for cattle is beyond any measure. However, this bond changes when the Jonglei Canal takes water from the sudd region because in addition to water shortages, ideal grazing patches for cattle will be interfered with because of the fact that the Canal passes through a vast area of land. Also all livestock will be affected by lack of means to cross over to grazing areas because the Canal is not passable. The Canal is so deep that a single attempt to look half-way into it causes people incomprehensible dizziness and confusion. Now, it lies as one huge empty man-made hole, towering above the plain lands of the Jonglei region, awaiting the second digging attempt.

Fishing is yet another equally important practice in the lives of people around the Canal. With the Nile River as an endless blessing, the swamp provides countless number of fish. People supplement their dietary needs when they go fishing and upon return, their families get more food. This fishing right will diminish as the Jonglei Canal sucks away almost all water. The reason is that fish love large bodies of water. They will follow the roaring current as water moves from swamps and other rivers to dams in Egypt and North Sudan. The fact that oil companies are drilling with painful impunity threatens not only the people who are concerned about water pollution but also the lives of fish. This is because as oil spills underground, it gets into water when rivers overflow, and as that same water goes underground, oil remains and the fish die from the accumulation of oil on the water’s surface. This oil blocks the life-giving light of the sun.

Reviving the Canal also poses many challenges to the human population settlements. The Canal passes through the Shilluk, Nuer, and Dinka lands. “Some 200 or more have already been forced to move from their traditional homesteads because the canal has crossed over their land” (Lako 33). This happened right at the beginning of the canal construction and by the time it had reached ¾ of the destination, it was unpredictable how many people got displaced. The displacement was compounded by one thing: the Sudan government’s inability to plan in advance for those affected by the canal. The gesture, being political in nature this time as it was then, interrupts the social-economic ways of life for the tribes living in the region.

The government believes that by disrupting locals’ subsistence agriculture and replacing it with modern and mechanized farming systems, it is improving the economy. This is misguided at best. Mohamed Suliman of the Institute for African Alternatives in UK captured the sentiments of the people of Jonglei:

The 450,000 Dinka, Shilluk, and Nuer who were directly affected feared the drastic changes the Canal would bring to their way of life. They could not accept the prospect of life without the migration to the toich (swamp camps) during the dry season, a time during which they would find fish and improve the milk yield of their cows. They also feared the prospect of aliens being settled in their midst, and the possibility of conflict. Rumors that Egyptian farmers would be sent to the canal area sparked student riots in Juba in November 1974. There was justifiable mistrust of the project from southern Sudanese who saw the North and Egypt benefiting while their own lives were irreversibly and negatively changed (Suliman 15).

The Nuer and Dinka have always lived life around the sudd. In an article by Human Right Watch, “the living patterns of Dinka and Nuer have been determined in great measure by geography…their agro-pastoral lifestyle has been adapted to the periodic flooding and dryness” (4). Many opposing view may say that the diseases that contract the local population due to flooding can be kept at bay through the digging of the canal, but the damage that will visit after the canal is dug is irreparable. The Dinka and Nuer can count on the recent development in the South that will pave the way for control of floods through either dams or other means. Douglas Johnson emphasized that “the use of floods records in the reconstruction of African history is both a challenging and controversial undertaking” (607).

The calculation behind the canal is not for irrigation per se, or to get rid of disease. Rather, to both Egypt and Sudan, the Jonglei canal has a chance of being used as an instrument to consolidate and strengthen political hold, starting with resource monopoly, using the devilish formula of economic marginalization of the entire south Sudan. The Two know that South Sudan has a unique and fascinating geography. It enjoys plenty of rain while the north part is prone to a high degree of heat due to its being in the desert. Although the soil in the south favors agriculture, the Journal of African History terms it as “clay plains [and] harsh for inhabitants” (Johnson 463). But the fact that the Nile River passes through south Sudan is an immense advantage although that has not always meant a great deal of relief for those in the south because as long as the political fate of their region is in the hands of select few from the north, reliance on mixed farming is the way out.. Back in the colonial era, the British made sure economic development was concentrated in the north because the Black Africans in the south were stuck to their indigenous ways of living, making them the pariah of the trading system. “When the colonial powers introduced their market economy in Sudan towards the end of the last century, they simultaneously restricted its development and expansion by indigenous Sudanese in order to maintain political and economic control” (Suliman 1). The plan to revive the canal is seen by southerners as an attempt to open their region up for external dealings

The same dealing is being seen in a number of areas around Jonglei region. Right now many oil companies from China, Malaysia, Canada, France, and Sudan are busy drilling oil on south Sudan soils. This is without due regard for the people to whom the oil belongs. It is appalling how external agencies charged with prior assessments of the area ended with recommendations that the drilling presented no problems for the local areas. What is implied in their messages is that the people of Sudd or Jonglei rather have no expertise and political backing to refute the findings, and as long as oil is a hotly demanded commodity on the world market, its digging is inevitable and overrides any future environmental problems for the local populations. Despite warnings from Sudanese ecologists and environmentalists about water contaminations from oil spillage, the drillings are going on, business as usual.

According to an article, “the neglect of the Environment”, , the Human Rights Watch requested two companies, Talisman, and Lundin, to carry out assessments around oil blocks but the two, to the chagrin of many, did little to provide the comprehensive data. The “Talisman, as part of its campaign to disprove the existence of human beings in its concession areas, commissioned a special report of satellite images showing the changes in carefully selected parts of the earth’s surface in Western Upper Nile/Unity state from 1965 to 2000”(HRW). The discrepancy—lack of commitment—on the part of oil companies was very telling. This report by oil companies attempted to make one point: that their business is ethical and free from Human Rights concerns. The same concerns are shared by the locals who are vulnerable to all sorts of hazardous material, both from the canal digging and from oil drilling in the area.

In the South, the mainstream perception was hostile. This came in two forms: that of political leaders and that of local population from the Jonglei area. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement, championing the cause of freedom for all of the marginalized people of Sudan, was against the digging of the Jonglei Canal. Dr. John Garang, the SPLM leader, had just finished his doctoral dissertation on the Jonglei canal from Iowa State University. His dissertation took issue with the project itself. The position was that of rejection. Prior to SPLM reaction, there was a conference that brought together a diverse following: planners, aid agencies, and local people from canal area, elders, engineers, and researchers. The theme that emerged from the meeting was that of frustration and rejection. Dr. Garang’s leadership through the SPLM political and foreign affairs representative began sending out letters of warning. The first letter was addressed to the government of Egypt outlining “the failure to honor promises to the Southern Sudanese, of which the installation of pipes for drinking water and irrigation led the list” (Collins 397). Joseph Oduho, the SPLM representative at the time, made it clear how the Egyptian and Sudanese governments had reneged on their promises: schools, dispensaries, and bridges were never given to the people of South Sudan.

The second letter was sent out to three companies: Chevron, Total, and the CCI which were around the canal. These companies were told to stop operating with an immediate effect. Dr. Garang, a man filled with vision, and inseparable bond for the area, said that:

If Jonglei Canal were developed merely as a conduit for water to irrigate Egypt and the Sudan, it would disrupt the traditional way of living of the Nilotic peoples with no compensating advantages. If properly designed, managed, and financed, the canal had the potential to create opportunities for regional development and national integration far beyond the localized schemes of integrated rural developments which [he] dismissed as marginal improvement. He identified four basic necessities for preventing poverty and misery—modern drainage and irrigation works, mechanized farming, new forms of land tenure, and the reorganization of the country side into compact villages. (qtd. in Collins 394)

Dr. Garang’s primary concern was the inherently deficient strategies involved with the project.

Those same perceptions have not faded two decades later. Just as recently as four months ago, the minister of Water Resources and Irrigation under the newly formed Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) hinted at Egypt’s insatiable greed for water. This was during a meeting to address issues of water management in the region. The Minster said that if ever there is a thought of resuming the Jonglei Canal in the future, “the jobs have to be provided to the Southerners, the land-ownership will be with the GOSS, shared with the tribes originating from that area” (Juba Post 1). Infamous as always, Egypt is poised to prevail upon South Sudanese and other interests objecting to the idea of resuming the canal. But there is need for relative calm in the south after years of devastating civil war; plans need to come after the six-year period to see if there is need for containing water that overflows from the Nile. It will be up to those in Jonglei to exercise their rights to see if there is need for constructing dams. This process will require technical expertise and capital to undertake the construction.

The many litany of canvassing involved in the Jonglei scheme are tips of the iceberg about the serious disputes awaiting all countries of the Nile Basin. Mohamed Megahed of the Arab Union of Scientists and Researchers observes that “Egypt is the only nation with advanced technology, basin information, and substantial financial backing by developed countries and international organizations. Almost all Nile nations lack hydrological data, capital, modern technology, and support from international organizations and donor countries.”(2).

There is no doubt that lack of proper coordination and resources will always result in gross mismanagement of the Nile waters; the vice has crept into other water source points already. There is no treaty by all nations of the Nile that safeguards the rights to the use of Nile and other water bodies. There is an immense need for relevant international models on the use of waters and canal so that these African water crises may change for the better.

To South Sudanese, the idea to resume the canal has diversionary effects. With the Sudan peace in its 2 years since signing, efforts to start the canal will divert attention from the implementation of the peace between the North and the South. The state of Jonglei, the place of the canal in the South, floats on oil. Any permission to start the digging will result in tremendous race for oil drilling as multinational companies are eyeing the area with renewed interest. This marathon of drilling and digging will put the returning refugees at greater risks. All these activities have the likelihood of provoking the war, when over 2.5 million lives have already been lost. In the article, Averting Conflict in the Nile Basin, “Egypt is making a big effort to optimize the use of its limited resources by improving the efficiency of irrigation, changing crop patterns, lining irrigation canals and reusing drainage water”(5). If the other countries that share the Nile adopts good measure, then water may not become scarce,. If the same countries develop technical expertise through other international bodies that specialize in water management, then the crises may be averted. Martin Hvidt of the Middle Eastern Environment echoes the same theme by admitting that “improved planning and management procedures to appropriate, allocate and use water are key measures generally prescribed to make the optimum use of available water” (1).

In conclusion, the Sudan’s Jonglei canal is a symbol of imperialism around African water and resource politics. The canal is needed by Egypt and North Sudan to channel water for irrigation and electricity. The real agenda is that of dominating the Southern part f Sudan The canal has spanned over 5 decades; it has the potential of advancing the vision of Arab world: to tap the ridiculously rich Sudd region of South Sudan. The effects of a drained Sudd are grave to the environment, animals and the population in the south; they are irreparable. This is in addition to maintaining the pernicious political rule and status quo visa-avis the black Africans in the south. The Jonglei canal has got many multinational companies thinking about drilling because the same region is floating on oil.

The canal brings pollution both to the environment as well as to the water. Its digging should come later, especially when South Sudanese are able to determine their priorities. Now the peace process may get jeopardized if the canal resumes. Despite, constant push for its resumption, the Jonglei is not the only option to the looming water crises in Africa. There should be greater push for cooperation with international water bodies to put in place some initiatives on the use of the Nile waters and other tributaries like the Jonglei canal. Unless proper caution is geared toward conservancy, the prospects for turning the world’s largest Sudd region into desert are very near.

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About the author:*Joseph Deng Garang is a graduate from the University of Nebraska at Omaha with Bachleors of arts in International studies and Political Science, with specializations in International Management and Business, and Global Strategic Studies